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Reliable functioning of infrastructure networks is essential for our modern society since the dis-
ruption of any communication, transport or supply network poses serious risks to our normal life.
Cascading failures, namely events in which the initial and local failure of a component triggers a
sequence of multiple failures of other parts of the network, are the main cause of large-scale network
outages. Although cascading failures often exhibit dynamical transients, i.e., momentary variations
of the state of the system, the modelling of cascades has so far mainly focused on the analysis of
sequences of steady states. In this article, we focus on electrical supply networks and introduce a
general dynamical framework that takes into consideration both the event-based nature of cascades
and the details of the network dynamics. In this way, we account for possible losses of transmission
lines and for the dynamical transition from one steady state to the next, which can significantly
increase the vulnerability of a network. We find that transients in the flows of a supply network
play a crucial role in the emergence of collective behaviors and may cause cascades which cannot
be predicted by a steady-state analysis approach. We show that such dynamically-induced cascades
may systematically propagate across a network at a propagation speed we approximate by dividing
the effective distance from the position of the initial shock by the arrival time of the cascade. We
illustrate our results on a series of network case studies, including the real topology of the national
power grids of Spain, France and Great Britain. We finally propose a forecasting method that may
help to better understanding the stability conditions of a network, and also to identify its critical
lines and components in advance or during an exceptional situation. Overall, our work highlights
the relevance of dynamically induced failures on the synchronization dynamics of national power
grids of different European countries and it provides novel methods to predict and limit cascading
failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our daily lives heavily depend on the functioning of
many natural and man-made networks, ranging from
neuronal and gene regulatory networks over communi-
cation and transportation networks to electrical power
grids [1, 2]. Understanding the robustness of these net-
works with respect to random failures and to targeted
attacks is of outmost importance for preventing system
outages with severe implications [3]. Recent examples,
as the 2003 blackout in the Northeastern United States
[4], the major European blackout in 2006 [5] or the In-
dian blackout in 2012 [6] have shown that initially local
and small events can trigger large area outages of electric
supply networks affecting millions of people, with severe
economic and political consequences [7]. For this rea-
son, cascading failures have been studied intensively in
statistical physics, and different network topologies and
non-local effects have been considered and analyzed [8–
13]. Complementary studies have employed simplified
topologies that admit analytical insights, for instance in
terms of percolation theory [14] or minimum coupling
[15]. Results have shown, for instance, the robustness
of scale-free networks [3, 16, 17], or the vulnerability of
multiplex networks [18–20].
Although real-world cascades often include dynamical
transients of grid frequency and flow with very well de-
fined spatio-temporal structures, so far models of cas-
cading failures have mainly focused on event-triggered se-
quences of steady states [8, 10, 11, 21–24] or on purely dy-
namical descriptions of desynchronization without con-
sidering secondary failure of lines [25–29]. In particular,
in supply networks such as electric power grids, which
are considered as uniquely critical among all infrastruc-
tures [30, 31], the failure of transmission lines during a
blackout is determined not only by the network topol-
ogy and by the static distribution of the electricity flow,
but also by the collective transient dynamics of the en-
tire system. Indeed, during the severe outages mentioned
above, cascading failures over the electric power grids
happened on time scales of dozens of minutes overall,
but often started by the failure of a single element [32].
Conversely, sequences of individual line overloads took
place on a much shorter time scale of seconds [4, 5], the
time scale of systemic instabilities, emphasizing the role
of transient dynamics in the emergence of collective be-
haviors. Notwithstanding the importance of the tran-
sients, the causes, triggers and propagation of cascades
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
08
01
8v
1 
 [n
lin
.A
O]
  2
5 J
ul 
20
17
2induced by transient dynamics has been considered only
in a few works [9], and still needs to be systematically
studied [33].
In this article, we propose a general framework to ana-
lyze the impact of transient dynamics on the outcome of
cascading failures taking place over a complex network.
Namely, we go beyond purely topological or event-based
investigations and develop a dynamical model for supply
networks that incorporates both the event-based nature
of cascades and properties of network dynamics, includ-
ing transients, which, as we will show, can significantly
increase the vulnerability of a network [9]. These tran-
sients describe the dynamical response of system vari-
ables, such as grid frequency and power flow, when one
steady state is lost and the grid changes to a new steady
state. Combining microscopic nonlinear dynamics tech-
niques with a macroscopic statistical analysis of the sys-
tem, we will first show that, even when a supply network
seems to be robust because in the large majority of the
cases the initial failure of its lines does only have local
effects, there exist a few specific lines which can trigger
large-scale cascades. We will then analyze the vulnera-
bility of a supply network by looking at the dynamical
properties of cascading failures. To identify the critical
lines of the network we introduce and analytically derive
a flow-based classifier that is shown to outperform mea-
sures solely relying on the network topology, local loads
or network susceptibilities (line outage distribution fac-
tors). Finally, we demonstrate that cascades propagate
through the network at a characteristic speed if distance
is measured in an appropriate way, using effective dis-
tance measures [34].
The article is organized as follows. In Section II we
describe a general framework that is commonly adopted
to model the real-time dynamics of a power transmission
network on coarse scales. In Section III we discuss the
importance of dynamical transients in the development
of a cascade of subsequent failures induced by an initial
shock to the system, and we introduce our model of cas-
cading failures that properly takes these into account.
We then show how the model works on a small synthetic
network and when applied to some real case studies con-
sidering the real topology of the national power grids of
various European countries. In particular, in Section IV
we focus on the analysis of the statistical properties of
the cascades, while in Section V we introduce and dis-
cuss a method to identify the critical lines of a network,
i.e. those lines inducing cascading failures. Finally, in
Section VI we investigate the details of how a cascade
propagates.
II. MODELLING POWER GRIDS
When it comes to model the dynamics of a power trans-
mission network, the so-called swing equation is a simple
way to deal with the key features of the system as a
whole, namely its synchronization properties. Thereby,
we avoid dealing directly with a complete dynamical de-
scription in terms of complicated power grid simulation
software or static power-flow models which are routinely
used to simulate specific scenarios on large-scale power
grids by power engineers. The swing equation retains
the dynamical features of AC power grids, by describing
each of the elements of an electric power network as a
rotating machine characterized by its angle and its an-
gular velocity at a given time. In practice, a rotating
machine either represents a large synchronous generator
in a conventional power plant or a coherent subgroup,
i.e., a group of strongly coupled small machines and loads
which are tightly phase-locked in all cases. The angle of
each machine is assumed to be identical to the angle of
the complex voltage vector, so that the angle difference
of two machines determines the power flow between them
to transport, for example, energy from a producer to a
consumer.
More formally, let us suppose to have N rotatory
machines, each corresponding to a node of a network.
Each machine i, with i = 1, 2, . . . , N is characterized
by its mechanical rotor angle θi(t) and by its angular
velocity ωi := dθi/dt relative to the reference frame of
Ω = 2pi · (50 or 60) Hz. Furthermore, machine i either
feeds power into the network, acting as an effective gen-
erator with power Pi > 0, or absorbs power, acting as an
effective consumer (corresponding to the aggregate con-
sumers of an urban areas) with power Pi < 0. The swing
equation reads [28, 35, 36]:
d
dt
θi = ωi (1)
Ii
d
dt
ωi = Pi − γiωi +
N∑
j=1
Kij sin (θj − θi) ,
where γi is the homogeneous damping of an oscillator,
Ii is the inertia constant and Kij is a coupling matrix
governing the topology of the power grid network, and
the strength of the interactions. In the following, we
will both consider heterogeneous coupling Kij or we will
assume homogeneous coupling Kij = Kaij , where aij
are the entries of the unweighted adjacency matrix that
describes the connectivity of the network. For simplic-
ity, we assume homogeneous damping γi = γ and inertia
Ii = 1 for all i ∈ 1, ..., N . To derive Eq. (1) one has
to assume that the voltage amplitude Vi at each nodes
is time-independent, that ohmic losses are negligible and
that the changes in the angular velocity are small com-
pared to the reference ωi  Ω, see e.g, [30, 35] for details.
All these assumptions are fulfilled as long as we model
short time scales on the high-voltage transmission grid
[36] which will be sufficient for our study. The coupling
matrix Kij is an abbreviation for Kij = BijViVj where
Bij is the susceptance between two nodes [30]. The swing
equation is especially well suited to describe short time
scales, as they appear in typical large-scale power grid
cascades [4, 5, 7], however, we also discuss other models
3returning qualitatively similar results in the Supplemen-
tal Material [37].
The desired stable state of operation of the power grid
network is characterized by all machines running in syn-
chrony at the reference angular velocity Ω, i.e., ωi = 0
∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, implying ∑i Pi = 0. Thereby, we deter-
mine the fixed point by solving for the angles θ∗i in:
0 = Pi +
N∑
j=1
Kij sin
(
θ∗j − θ∗i
)
. (2)
The grid in its synchronous state is phase-locked, i.e.,
all angle differences do not change in time. This is impor-
tant since the angle difference determines the flow along
a line, and fluctuating angle differences would imply fluc-
tuating conducted power which can in turn lead to the
shutdown of a plant [30, 36]. Furthermore, transmission
system operators demand the frequency to stay within
strict boundaries to ensure stability and constant phase
locking [38].
Phase-locking and other synchronization phenomena
arise in many different domains and applications, and
have attracted the interest of physicists across fields [39].
One of the simplest synchronization models is the Ku-
ramoto model which has been used, among other applica-
tions, to describe synchronization phenomena in fireflies,
chemical reactions and simple neuronal models [40–43].
The swing equation shows similarities with the Kuromoto
model, including the sinusoidal form of the coupling func-
tion and the existence of a minimal coupling threshold to
achieve synchronization [27]. However, the swing equa-
tion includes a second derivative due to the inertial forces
in the grid. Both equations share the same fixed points
but the swing equations display dissipative forces and
limit cycles that are not present in the Kuramoto model.
III. THE DYNAMICS OF CASCADING
FAILURES
Failures are common in many interconnected systems,
such as communication, transport and supply networks,
which are fundamental ingredients of our modern soci-
eties. Usually, the failure of a single unit, or of a part
of a network, is modeled by removing or deactivating a
set of nodes or lines (or links) in the corresponding graph
[44]. The most elementary damage to a network consists
in the removal of a single line, since removing a node is
equivalent to deactivate more than one line, namely all
those line incident in the node. For this reason, in the
following of this work, we concentrate on line failures.
In practice, the malfunctioning of a line in a transporta-
tion/communication network can either be due to an ex-
ogenous or to an endogenous event [45, 46]. In the first
case, the line breakdown is caused by something external
to the network. Examples are the lightning strike of a
transmission line of the electric power grid, or the sag-
ging of a line in the heat of the summer. In the case of
endogenous events, instead, a line can fail because of an
overload due to an anomalous distributions of the flows
over the network. Hence, the failure is an effect of the
entire network.
Complex networks are also prone to cascading failures.
In these events, the failure of a component triggers the
successive failures of other parts of the network. In this
way, an initial local shock produces a sequence of mul-
tiple failures in a domino mechanism which may finally
affect a substantial part of the network. Cascading fail-
ures occur in transportation systems [47, 48], in computer
networks [49], in financial systems [50], but also in supply
networks [18]. When, for some either exogenous or en-
dogenous reason, a line of a supply network fails, its load
has to be somehow redistributed to the neighboring lines.
Although these lines are in general able to handle their
extra traffic, in a few unfortunate cases they will also go
overload and will need to redistribute their increased load
to their neighbors. This mechanism can lead to a cascade
of failures, with a large number of transmission lines af-
fected and malfunctioning at the same time. One particu-
lar critical supply network is the electrical power grid dis-
playing for example large-scale cascading failures during
the blackout on 14 August 2003, affecting millions of peo-
ple in North America, and the European blackout that
occurred on 4 November 2006. In order to model cascad-
ing failures in power transmission networks, we propose
to use the framework of the swing equation in Eq. (1) to
evaluate, at each time, the actual power flow along the
transmission lines of the network and compare it to the
actual available capacity of the lines. Typical studies of
network robustness and cascading failures in power grids
adopted quasi-static perspectives [8, 10, 11, 21–24, 51]
based on fixed-point estimates of the variables describ-
ing the node states. Such approach, in the context of the
swing equation, is equivalent to the evaluation of the an-
gles {θi} as the fixed point solution of Eq. (1) or power
flow analysis [30]. In contrast, we use here the swing
equation to dynamically update the angles θi (t) as func-
tions of time, and to compute real-time estimates of the
flow on each line. The flow on the line (i, j) at time t is
obtained as:
Fij (t) = Kij sin (θj (t)− θi (t)) . (3)
Having the time evolution of the flow along the line (i, j),
we compare it to the capacity Cij of the line, i.e., to
the maximum flow that the line can tolerate. There are
multiple options how we can define the capacity of a line
in the framework of the swing equation. One possibility
is the following. The dynamical model of Eq. (1) itself
would allow a maximum flow equal to Fij = Kij on the
line (i, j). However, in realistic settings, ohmic losses
would induce overheating of the lines which has to be
avoided. Hence, we assume that the capacity Cij is set
to be a tunable percentage of Kij . In order to prevent
damage and keep ground clearance [36, 52], the line (i, j)
is then shut down if the flow on it exceeds the value αKij ,
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Figure 1. Dynamical overload reveals additional lines failures compared to static flow analysis. (a) A five node power
network with two producers P+ = 1.5/s2 (green squares), three consumers P− = −1/s2 (red circles), homogeneous coupling
K ≈ 1.63/s2, and tolerance α = 0.6 is analyzed. To trigger a cascade, we remove the line marked with a lightening bolt
(2,4) at time t = 1s. (b) We observe a cascading failure with several additional line failures after the initial trigger due to
the propagation of overloads. (c) The common quasi-static approach of analyzing fixed point flows would have predicted no
additional line failures, since the new fixed point is stable with all flows below the capacity threshold. (d) Conversely, the
transient dynamics from the initial to the new fixed point overloads additional lines which then fail when their flows exceed
their capacity (gray area).
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a control parameter of our model. The
overload condition on the line (i, j) at time t finally reads:
overload: |Fij(t)| > Cij = αKij , (4)
Notice that the capacity Cij = αKij is an absolute capac-
ity, i.e., it is independent from the initial state of the sys-
tem. This is different from the definition of a relative ca-
pacity, C˜ij := (1 + α)Fij (0), which has been commonly
adopted in the literature [9, 21, 53].
Having defined the fixed point of the grid, given by the
solution of Eq. (2), and the capacity of each line, we ex-
plore the robustness of the network with respect to line
failures. We first consider the ideal scenario in which all
the elements of the grid are working properly, i.e., all
generators are running as scheduled and all the lines are
operational. We say that the grid is N − 0 stable [54]
if the network has a stable fixed point and the flows on
all lines are within the bounds of the security limits, i.e.
do not violate the overload condition Eq. (4), where the
flows are calculated by inserting the fixed point solution
into Eq. (3). Next, we assume the initial failure of a sin-
gle transmission line. We call the new network in which
the corresponding line has been removed the N − 1 grid.
Since the affected transmission line can be any of the |E|
lines of the network, we have |E| different N − 1 grids.
If the N − 1 grid still has a fixed point for all possible
|E| different initial failures, and all of these fixed points
result in flows within the capacity limits, the grid is said
to be N − 1 stable [30, 36, 52]. While traditional cas-
cade approaches usually test N − 0 or N − 1 stability
using mainly static flows, our proposal is to investigate
cascades by means of dynamically updated flows accord-
ing to the power grid dynamics of Eq. (3). This allows
for a more realistic modeling of real-time overloads and
line failures. In practice, this means to solve the swing
equation dynamically, update flows and compare to the
capacity rule Eq. (4), removing lines whenever they ex-
ceed their capacity. Thereby, our N − 1 stability crite-
rion demands not only the stable states to stay within
the capacity limits but also includes the transient flows
on all lines. See Supplemental Material for details on
our procedure and comparison of our framework to other
5methods.
In order to illustrate how our dynamical model for cas-
cading failures works in practice, we first consider the
case of the network with N = 5 nodes and |E| = 7
lines shown in Fig. 1. We assume that the network
has two generators, the two nodes reported as green
squares, characterized by a positive power P+ = 1.5/s2,
and three consumers, reported as red circles, with power
P− = −1/s2. For simplicity we have adopted here a
modified “per unit system” obtained by replacing real
machine parameters with dimensionless multiples with
respect to reference values. For instance, here a “per
unit” mechanical power Pper unit = 1/s2 corresponds to
the real value Preal = 100MW [30, 36]. Moreover, we as-
sume homogeneous line parameters throughout the grid,
namely, we fix the coupling for each couple of nodes i
and j as Kij = Kaij , with K = 1.63/s2. In order to
prepare the system in its stable state, we solve Eq. (2)
and calculate the corresponding flows at equilibrium. We
then fix a threshold value of α = 0.6. With such a value
of the threshold, none of the flows is in the overload con-
dition of Eq. (4), and the grid is N − 0 stable. Next,
we perturb the stable steady state of the grid with an
initial exogenous perturbation. Namely, we assume that
line (2, 4) fails at time t = 1, due to an external distur-
bance. By using again the static approach of Eq. (2) to
calculate the new steady state of the system, it is found
that all flows have changed but they still are all below
the limit of 0.6, as shown in Fig. 1(c). Hence, with
respect to a static analysis, the grid is N − 1-stable to
the failure of line (2, 4). Despite this, the capacity crite-
rion in Eq. (4) can be violated transiently, and secondary
outages emerge dynamically. As Fig. 1(d) shows, this is
indeed what happens in the example considered. Approx-
imately one second after the initial failure, the line (4, 5)
is overloaded, which causes a secondary failure, leading
to additional overloads on other lines and their failure in
a cascading process that eventually leads to the discon-
nection of the entire grid. The whole dynamics of the
cascade of failures induced by the initial removal of line
(2, 4) is reported in Fig. 1(d).
Dynamical cascades are not limited to small networks
as the one considered in this example, but also appear
in large networks. In order to show this, we have im-
plemented our model for cascading failures on a network
based on the real structure of the Spanish high voltage
transmission grid. The network is reported in Fig. 2
and has NSpanish = 98 nodes and |E|Spanish = 175 edges.
We select a set of distributed producers (green squares),
each with a positive power P+ = 1/s2, and consumers
(red circles), with negative power P− = −1/s2. As in the
case of the previous example, we adopt a homogeneous
coupling, namely we fix Kij = K · aij with K = 5/s2
for each couple of nodes i and j. We also fix a tolerance
value α = 0.52, such that none of the flows is in the over-
load condition of Eq. (4), and the grid is initially N − 0
stable. We notice from the effects of cascading failures
shown in Fig. 2 that the choice of the trigger line sig-
nificantly influences the total number of lines damaged
during a cascade. For instance, the initial damage of line
1 (dashed red line) causes a large cascade of failures with
14 lines damaged in the first seven seconds, while the ini-
tial damage of line 2 (dashed blue line) does not cause
any further line failure, as the initial shock is in this case
perfectly absorbed by the network. Figure 2 also displays
the average number of failing lines as a function of time.
Here, we average over all lines of the network considered
as initially damaged lines. We notice that the cascading
process is relatively fast, with all the failures taking place
within the first TCascade = 20 s. This further supports the
adoption of the swing equation, which is indeed mainly
used to describe short time scales, while more complex
and less tractable models are required to model longer
times [36].
IV. STATISTICS OF DYNAMICAL CASCADES
To better characterize the potential effects of cascad-
ing failures in electric power grids, we have studied the
statistical properties of cascades on the topology of real-
world power transmission grids, such as those of Spain
and France [55]. In particular, we have considered the
two systems under different values of the tolerance pa-
rameter α [21], and for various distributions of producers
and consumers on the network. As in the examples of
the previous section, we have also analyzed all the possi-
ble initial damages triggering the cascade. To assess the
consequences of a cascade, we have focused on the follow-
ing two quantities. First, we analyze the number of lines
that suffered an overload, and are thus shut down during
the cascading failure process. This number is a measure
of the total damage suffered by the system in terms of
loss of its connectivity. Second, we record the fraction of
nodes that have experienced a desynchronization during
the cascade, which represents a proxy for the number of
consumers affected by a blackout (see Supplemental Ma-
terial for details). In both the cases of affected lines and
affected nodes, the numbers we look at are those obtained
at the end of the cascading failure process.
Fig. 3 shows the results obtained for the case of the
network of the Spanish power transmission grid. The
same homogeneous coupling and distribution of produc-
ers and consumers is adopted as in Fig. 2. We have
considered each of the lines as a possible initial trigger of
the cascade, and averaged the final number of line fail-
ures and unsynchronized nodes over all realizations of the
dynamical process. We have repeated this for multiple
values of the tolerance coefficient α. As expected, a larger
tolerance results in fewer line failures and fewer unsyn-
chronized nodes, because it makes the overload condition
of Eq. (4) more difficult to be satisfied. As we decrease
the network tolerance α, the total number of affected
lines and unsynchronized nodes after the cascade sud-
denly increases at a value α ≈ 0.5, where we start to
observe a propagation of the cascade induced by the ini-
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Figure 2. The effect of a cascade of failures strongly depends on the choice of the initially damaged line. (a) The network of the
Spanish power grid with distributed producers with P+ = 1/s2 (green squares) and consumers with P− = −1/s2 (red circles),
homogeneous coupling K = 5/s2, and tolerance α = 0.52 is analyzed. Two different trigger lines are selected. (b) The number
of line failures as a function of time for the two different trigger lines highlighted in panel (a) and for an average over all the
possible initial damages. Some lines do only cause a single line failure, while others affect a substantial amount of the network.
On average most line failures do take place within the first ≈ 20 seconds of the cascade.
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Figure 3. Effects of cascading failures in the Spanish power grid under different levels of tolerance. (a) The percentage of line
failures in our model of cascading failures (circles), under different values of tolerance α is compared to the results of a static
fixed point flow analysis (squares). The static analysis largely underestimates the actual number of line failures in a dynamical
approach. The difference between static and dynamical analysis is especially clear in the inset where we focus on the lowest
values of α at which the network is N − 0 stable. The gray area is N − 0 unstable, i.e., the network without any external
damage already has overloaded lines. (b) Percentage of unsynchronized (damaged) nodes after the cascade as a function of
the tolerance α. All analysis has been performed under the same distribution of producers and consumers as in Fig. 2, with
homogeneous coupling of K = 5s−2.
tial external damage. Crucially, a dynamical approach,
as the one considered in our model, identifies a signifi-
cantly larger number of line failures (circles) compared
to a static approach (squares). This is clearly visible in
the inset of the left hand side of Fig. 3, where we zoom to
the lowest values of α at which the network is N − 0 sta-
ble. For instance, at α = 0.52 our model predicts that an
average of six lines of the Spanish power grid are affected
by the initial damage of a line of the network through a
propagation of failures. Such a vulnerability of the net-
work is completely unnoticeable by a static approach to
cascading failures based on the analysis of fixed points.
The static approach reveals in fact that on average only
another line of the network will be affected. We also note
that the increase in the number of unsynchronized nodes
for decreasing values of α is much sharper than that for
overloaded lines. Below a value of α ≈ 0.5 the number
of unsynchronized nodes jumps to 100%. This transi-
tion indicates a loss of the N − 0 stability of the system,
meaning that, already in the unperturbed state several
7lines are overloaded according to the capacity criterion
in Eq. (4) and thus fail. To study only genuine effects
of cascades, in the following we restrict ourselves to the
case α > 0.5, where the grid is N − 0 stable, but not
necessarily N −1 stable. Furthermore, to assess the final
impact of a cascade on a network, we mainly focus on
total number of affected lines [4, 5]. As discussed in Sec-
tion III, damages to lines are indeed the most elementary
type of network damages.
Furthermore, we have explored the role of centralized
versus distributed power production, and that of hetero-
geneous couplings Kij , and also extended our analysis
to other network topologies of European national power
grids, namely those of France and of Great Britain (see
Supplemental Material). In Fig. 4 we compare the re-
sults obtained for the Spanish network topology (three
top panels) to those obtained for the French network
(three bottom panels). With NFrench = 146 nodes and
|E|French = 223 edges the French power grid is larger
in size than the Spanish one considered in the previous
figures (NSpanish = 98 and |E|Spanish = 175) and has a
smaller clustering coefficient. In each case, we have cal-
culated the total number of line failures at the end of the
cascading failure when any possible line of the network
is used as the initial trigger of the cascade. We then plot
the probability of having a certain number of line failures
in the process, so that the histogram reported indicates
the size of the largest cascades and how often they occur.
Notice that the probability axis uses a log-scale. For each
network we have considered both distributed and central-
ized locations of power producers, and both homogeneous
and heterogeneous network couplings. The centralized
production is thereby a good approximation to the clas-
sical power grid design with few large fossil and nuclear
power plants powering the whole grid. In contrast, the
distributed production scheme describes well the case in
which many small (wind, solar, biofuel, etc.) generators
are distributed across the grid [25]. Finally, the choice of
heterogeneous coupling is motivated by economic consid-
erations, since maintaining a transmission network costs
money and only those lines that actually carry flow are
used in practice. In particular, we have worked under the
following three different types of settings:
1. Distributed power and homogeneous couplings
Equal number of producers and consumers in the
network, each of them having respectively P+ =
1/s2 and P− = −1/s2. Homogeneous coupling
with Kij = Kaij and K = 5/s2 for the Spanish
(as in case of the previous figures) and K = 8/s2
for the French grid. Results shown in panels (a)
and (d);
2. Centralized power and homogeneous couplings Con-
sumers with P− = −1/s2 and fewer but larger pro-
ducers with P+ ≈ 6/s2. Homogeneous coupling
with K = 10/s2 for the Spanish and K = 9/s2 for
the French grid. Results shown in panels (b) and
(e);
3. Distributed power and heterogeneous coupling Ho-
mogeneous distribution of producers and con-
sumers as in case 1. Heterogeneous distribution of
the Kij , so that the fixed point flows on the lines
are approximately F ≈ 0.5K both for the Spanish
and the French grid (see Supplemental Material for
details). Results shown in panels (c) and (f).
In each of the above cases, we work in conditions such
that no line is overloaded before the initial exogenous
damage. We have performed simulations for two val-
ues of the tolerance parameter α. For each of the two
grids and of the three conditions above, the lowest value
α = α1 has been selected to be equal to the minimal tol-
erance such that each the network is N−0 stable (yellow
histograms). In addition, we have considered a second,
larger value of the tolerance, α2, showing qualitatively
different behaviors (blue histograms). As found in other
studies [25–27, 29], the (homogeneous) coupling K has
to be larger for centralized production compared to dis-
tributed small producers to achieve comparable stability.
The first thing to notice from the histograms in Fig.
4(a) is that in most of the cases the initial failure of
a line does not cause any cascade at all, or very small
ones. This means that the Spanish grid is in most of
the cases N − 1 stable even in our dynamical model of
cascades. Nevertheless, for α1, there exist a few lines
that, when damaged, trigger a substantial part of the
network to be disconnected. This leads to the question
whether and how the distribution of producers or the
topology of the network impact the size and frequency of
the cascade. When comparing distributed (many small
producers) in panel (a) to centralized power production
(few large producers) in panel (b) we do not observe a
significant difference in the statistics of the cascades. The
same holds when comparing different network topologies,
such as the Spanish and the French grid in panels (d) and
(e).
Conversely, allowing heterogeneous couplings intro-
duces notable differences to emerge in panels (c) and (f).
To obtain heterogeneous couplings, we have scaled Kij
at each line proportional to the flow at the stable op-
erational state (see Supplemental Material). Thereby,
we try to emulate cost-efficient grid planning which only
includes lines when they are used. However, our results
show that, under these conditions, the flow on a line with
large coupling cannot easily be re-routed in our hetero-
geneous network when it fails [29]. For certain initially
damaged lines, this leads to very large cascades in grids
with heterogeneous coupling Kij . For instance, both the
Spanish and the French power grid show a peak of proba-
bility corresponding to cascades of about 150 line failures
when α = α1. But also in the case of α2 = 0.8, which
corresponds to a N − 1 stable situation under the ho-
mogeneous coupling condition, the Spanish grid exhibits
cascades involving from 50 to 100 lines in 5% of the cases
under heterogeneous couplings, see panel (c). The final
number of unsynchronized nodes after the cascade, used
as a measure of the network damage follows qualitatively
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Figure 4. Network damage distributions in the Spanish and French power grids under different power allocations and types
of coupling. The histograms shown have been obtained under three different settings. Panels (a) and (d) refer to the case of
distributed power, i.e., equal number of producers and consumers, each with P− = −1/s2 and P+ = 1/s2, and homogeneous
coupling with K = 5/s2 for the Spanish and K = 8/s2 for the French grid. Panels (b) and (e) refer to the case of centralized
power, i.e., consumers with P− = −1/s2 and fewer but larger producers with P+ ≈ 6/s2, and homogeneous coupling with
K = 10/s2 for Spanish and K = 9/s2 for the French grid. Panels (c) and (f) refer to a case of distributed power as in panel
(a) and (d), but with heterogeneous coupling, so that the fixed point flows on the lines are approximately F ≈ 0.5K both for
the Spanish and the French grid. For all plots we use two different tolerances α, where the lower one is the smallest simulated
value of α so that there are no initially overloaded lines (N − 0 stable).
a similar statistics as shown in Fig. 4. Namely, dis-
tributed and centralized power productions return simi-
lar statistical distributions of damage, while under het-
erogeneous couplings the system behaves differently. Fur-
thermore, for each network, we have recorded the two
extreme situations in which either all nodes or the grid
stay synchronized, or the whole grid desynchronizes (see
Supplemental Material).
The results obtained in this section have important in-
dications for the stability of a power grid. We have shown
that a network which is initially stable (N − 0 stability),
and remains stable even to the initial damage of a line
(N − 1 stability) according to the standard static anal-
ysis of cascades, can display large-scale dynamical cas-
cades when properly modeled. Although these dynamical
overload events often have a very low probability, their
occurrence cannot be neglected since they may collapse
the entire power transmission network with catastrophic
consequences. In the examples studied, we have found
that some critical lines cause cascades resulting in a loss
of up to 85% of the edges (Fig. 4(c)). Hence, it is ex-
tremely important to develop methods to identify such
critical lines, which is the subject of the next section.
V. IDENTIFYING CRITICAL LINES
The statistical analysis presented in the previous sec-
tion revealed that the size of the cascades triggered by
different line failures is very heterogeneous. Most lines of
the networks investigated are not critical, i.e., they are
either N − 1 stable even in our dynamical model of cas-
cades, or cause only a very small number of secondary
outages. However, for heavily loaded grids, as reported
in Fig. 4, some highly critical lines emerge. Thereby,
the initial failure of a single transmission line causes a
global cascade with the desynchronization of the major-
ity of nodes, leading to large blackouts. The key question
here is whether it is possible to devise a fast method to
identify the critical lines of a network. This might prove
to be very useful when it comes to improving the ro-
bustness of the network. In this section, we introduce a
novel flow-based indicator for the onset of a cascade and
demonstrate the effectiveness of its predictions by com-
paring them to results of the numerical simulation. In
particular, we show that our indicator is able to identify
the critical links of the network much better than other
measures purely based on the topology or steady state of
the network, such as the edge betweenness [12, 21, 22].
In order to define a flow-based predictor for the onset
of a cascading failure, let us consider the typical time
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Figure 5. Introducing a flow-based estimator of the onset of
a cascade. When cutting an initial line, the flows on a typ-
ical edge (i, j) of the network increase from F old(red line)
to F new (orange line). Based on numerical observations, the
transient flow F (t) from the old to the new fixed point are
well approximated as sinusoidal damped oscillation. Know-
ing the fixed point flows, allows to compute the difference
∆F = F new−F old and estimate the maximum transient flow
as Fmax ≈ F old + 2∆F . This estimation is typically slightly
larger than the real flow because the latter is damped.
evolution of the flow along a line after the initial removal
of the first damaged line (a, b). As illustrated in Fig.
5, we observe flow oscillations after the initial line fail-
ure, which are well approximated by a damped sinusoidal
function of time. See also the Supplemental Material for
the time evolutions of the flows for the case of the N = 5
node graph introduced in Fig. 1. Now, the steady flows
of the network before and after the removal of the trigger
line are obtained by solving Eq. (2) for the fixed point
angles {θ∗i }, which depend on the node powers {Pi} and
on the coupling matrix {Kij}. Thereby, we obtain a set
of nonlinear algebraic equations which have at least one
solution if the coupling K is larger than the critical cou-
pling [27]. For sufficiently large values of the coupling
K there can be multiple fixed points [56]. In each case,
we determine a single fixed point with small initial flows
by using Newton’s method (see Supplemental Material
for details). From the values of the fixed point angles
{θ∗} we calculate the equilibrium flow along each line,
for instance line (i, j), before and after the removal of
the trigger line, from the expression:
F *ij = K sin
(
θ∗j − θ∗i
)
. (5)
Let us indicate the initial flow along line (i, j) in the
intact network as F oldij , and the new flow after the removal
of the trigger line as F newij , assuming there still is a fixed
point. Given enough time, the system settles in the new
fixed point and the change of flow on the line is ∆Fij =
F newij −F oldij . Based on the oscillatory behavior observed
in cascading events, see Fig. 5 for an illustration, we
approximate the time-dependent flow on the line close to
the new fixed point as:
Fij (t) ≈ F newij −∆Fij cos (νijt) e−Dt, (6)
where νij is the oscillation frequency specific to the link
(i, j) and D is a damping factor. The maximum flow
Fmaxij on the line during the transient phase is then given
by:
Fmaxij ≈ F oldij + 2∆Fij . (7)
Hence, for our cascade predictor we propose to test
whether a line will be overloaded during the transient
by computing Fmaxij from the expression above and by
checking whether Fmaxij is larger than the available ca-
pacity Cij of the link. While this provides a good ap-
proximation of the real flows, we need to compute the
fixed point of the intact network and that after the ini-
tial trigger line is removed. This has to be repeated for
each possible initial trigger line, so that we need to com-
pute |E| + 1 fixed points, with |E| being the number
of edges. A possible way to simplify this procedure is to
compute the fixed point flows of the intact grid F oldij only,
approximating the fixed point flows after changes of the
network topology by the so-called Line Outage Distribu-
tion Factor (LODF) [57, 58]. Details on this method can
be found in the Supplemental Material.
After starting the cascade by removing line (a, b), we
define our analytical prediction for the minimal transient
tolerance
(
α
tr. (a,b)
ij
)
min
based on the maximum transient
flow on line (i, j) given in Eq. (7):(
α
tr. (a,b)
ij
)
min
= Fmaxij (8)
such that, if α >
(
α
tr. (a,b)
ij
)
min
, then cutting line (a, b) as
a trigger will not affect line (i, j). Finally, we define the
minimal tolerance
(
αtr. (a,b)
)
min of the network as that
value of α such that there is no secondary failure after
the initial failure of the trigger line, i.e., the grid is N −1
secure. We have:(
αtr. (a,b)
)
min
= max
(i,j)
(
α
tr. (a,b)
ij
)
min
= max
(i,j)
(
Fmaxij
)
,
(9)
where the maximum is taken with respect to all links
(i, j) in the network and one trigger link (a, b). If we
set α ≥ (αtr. (a,b))min then, according to our prediction
method, we expect no additional line failures further to
the initial damaged line. Let us assume that the network
topology is given, for instance that of a real national
power grid, and that the tolerance level is preset due to
external constrains like security regulations. Then, the
calculation of
(
αtr. (a,b)
)
min allows to engineer a resilient
grid by trying out different realizations of Kij . When
changes of Kij are small, the new fixed point flows are
approximated by linear response of the old flows [57] giv-
ing us an easy way to design the power grid to fulfill
safety requirements.
To measure the quality of our predictor for critical lines
and to compare it to alternative predictors, we quantify
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Figure 6. Comparing the predictions of our flow-based indicator of critical lines to other standard measures. Four different
predictors are presented to determine whether a given line, if chosen as initially damaged, causes at least one additional line
failures. Our dynamical predictor (indicated as Transient) is based on the estimated maximum transient flow (7). The predictor
based on the Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) [57, 58] uses the same idea but computes the new fixed flows based on
a linearization of the flow computation. Predictors based on betweenness and initial load classify a line as critical if it is within
the top σth × 100% of the edges with highest betweenness/load with threshold σth ∈ [0, 1]. Panel (a) shows the ROC curves
obtained for the Spanish grid with heterogeneous coupling and tolerance α = 0.7, while in panel (b) the AUC is displayed for
all network settings presented in Fig. 4. For each predictor all individual scores are displayed on the left and the mean with
error bars based on one standard deviation is shown on the right.
its performance by evaluating how often it detects crit-
ical lines as critical (true positives) with respect to how
often it gives false alarms (false positives). In our model
for cascading failures, a potential trigger line is classified
as truly critical if its removal causes additional secondary
failures in the network according to the numerical simu-
lations of the dynamics [29]. Our flow-based prediction
is obtained by first calculating the minimal tolerance of
the network
(
αtr. (a,b)
)
min based on Eq. (9) and compar-
ing it with the fixed tolerance α of a given simulation. If
the obtained minimal tolerance is larger than the value
of tolerance used in the numerical simulation, than the
line is classified as critical by our predictor and additional
overloads are to be expected. More formally, we use the
following prediction rules:(
αtr. (a,b)
)
min
≥ α+ σth ⇒ critical,(
αtr. (a,b)
)
min
< α+ σth ⇒ not critical. (10)
with a variable threshold σth ∈ [−1, 1], which allows to
tune the sensitiviy of the predictor.
Analogously, we define a second predictor based on
the Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) [57, 58].
In this case, the expected minimal tolerance is obtained
by approximating the new flow by the LODF, instead of
computing them by solving for the new fixed points (see
Supplemental Material).
We compare our predictors based on the flow dynamics
to the pure topological (or steady-state based) measures
that have been used in the classical analysis of cascades
on networks. The idea behind such measures is the fol-
lowing. First, we consider the initial load on all potential
trigger lines (a, b): L(a,b) = Fab(t = 0), i.e., the flow at
time t = 0 on the line, when the system is in its steady
state. Intuitively, highly loaded lines are expected to be
more critical than less loaded ones. Hence, comparing
each load L(a,b) to the maximum load on any line in the
grid Lmax := max(i,j) L(i,j) leads to the following predic-
tion:
L(a,b) ≥ (1− σth)Lmax ⇒ critical,
L(a,b) <
(
1− σth)Lmax ⇒ not critical, (11)
where σth ∈ [0, 1] is the prediction threshold.
Another quantity that is often used as a measure of the
importance of a network edge is the edge betweenness
[1, 2]. The betweenness b(a,b) of edge (a, b) is defined
as the normalized number of shortest paths passing by
the edge. A predictor based on the edge betweenness
b(a,b) is then obtained by replacing L(a,b) by b(a,b) in the
expressions above.
To evaluate the predictive power of our flow-based cas-
cade predictors and to compare them to the standard
topological predictors, we have computed the number of
lines that cause a cascade by simulation and compared
how often each predictor correctly predicted the cascade
thereby deriving the rate of correct cascade predictions
(true positive rate) and rate of false alarms (false posi-
tive rate). These two quantities are displayed in a Re-
ceiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) curve, which re-
ports the true positive rate versus the false positive rate
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when varying the threshold σth. The ROC curve would
go up straight from point (0, 0) to point (0, 1) in the
ideal case in which the predictor is able to detect all
real cascade events, while never giving a false positive.
Conversely, random guessing corresponds to the bisec-
tor. Finally, any realistic predictor starts at the point
(0, 0), i.e. never giving an alarm regardless of the set-
ting, and evolves to the point (1, 1), i.e. always giving
an alarm. The transition from (0, 0) to (1, 1) is tuned by
decreasing the threshold σth determining when to give
an alarm. The ROC curves corresponding to the predic-
tors introduced above are shown in Fig. 6 (a). Notice
that a prediction based on the betweenness of the line is
only as good as a random guess. In contrast, using the
LODF and the initial load provide much better predic-
tions. Finally, the analytical prediction outperforms any
other method, well approximating an a ideal predictor.
An alternative way to quantify the quality of a pre-
dictor is by evaluating the Area Under Curve (AUC),
that is the size of the area under the ROC curve. An
ideal predictor would correspond to the maximum pos-
sible value AUC= 1, while a random guess produces an
AUC of 0.5. So the closer the value of AUC for a given
predictor is to 1, the better are the obtained predictions.
AUC scores have been computed for different networks,
settings and parameters. The results for the dynamical
flow-based predictor, the predictor based on the LODF,
as well as the initial load and betweenness predictors,
are shown in Fig. 6(b). The values of the AUC scores
reported correspond to all the different settings described
in Fig. 4, allowing a more systematic comparison of pre-
dictors than that provided by a single ROC curve. Also
from this figure it is clear that a prediction of the crit-
ical links based on their betweenness is on average only
slightly better than random guessing. Furthermore, this
result rises concerns on the indiscriminate use of the be-
tweenness as a measure of centrality in complex networks.
Especially when the dynamical processes of interest are
well known, this must be taken into account in the defi-
nition of dynamical centrality measures for complex net-
works [12, 59, 60]. The LODF and initial load predictors
perform relatively better on average, although they still
display large standard deviations. This means that, for
certain networks and settings they reach an AUC score
close to the perfect value of 1, while in some other cases
they only reach values of AUC equal to 0.8. Of these
two indicators, the initial load predictor results are more
reliable. Finally, our dynamical predictor, indicated in
figure as “Transient” outperforms all alternative ones, in
every single parameter and network realization. The fig-
ure indicates that the corresponding AUC scores reach
values very close to 1. Moreover, this indicator displays
the smallest standard deviation when different networks
and parameter settings are considered. In conclusion,
this seems to be the best indicator for the criticality of a
link. However, the results show that, although the initial
load predictor performs worse than our dynamical one,
it might still be used when computational resources are
scarce as it provides the second best predictions among
those considered.
VI. CASCADE PROPAGATION
What we have shown so far is that network cascades,
i.e., secondary failures following an initial trigger, can
well be caused by transient dynamical effects. We have
proposed a model of supply networks that takes this into
account, and we have also developed a reliable method
to predict whether additional lines can be affected by an
initial damage, potentially triggering a cascade of fail-
ures. However, knowing whether a cascade develops or
not does not answer another important question that is
to understand how the cascade evolves over the network,
and which nodes and links are affected and when. Intu-
itively, we expect that network components farther away
from the initial failure should be affected later by the cas-
cade. However, we have found that the graph distance
between a secondary failure and the initial shock is not a
strictly linear function of the arrival time of the cascade
(see Supplemental Material). A much better correlation
between distance from the initial shock and arrival time
of the failure is obtained by making use of a so-called
effective distance, based on the characteristic of the flow
from one node to its neighbors. This idea has been first
introduced in Ref. [34] in the context of disease spreading,
where the effective distance has been shown to be able
to capture spreading phenomena better than the stan-
dard graph distance. The effective distance between two
vertices i and j can be defined in our case as:
dij = 1− log
(
Kij∑N
k=1Kik
)
. (12)
Here, we used the coupling matrix Kij as a measure of
the flows between nodes [34]. Notice that all couples of
nodes not sharing an edge, i.e. such that Kij = 0, have
infinite effective distance dij =∞. At each node the cas-
cade spreads to all neighbors but those that are coupled
tightly, get affected the most and hence get assigned the
smallest distance dij . Furthermore, the effective distance
is an asymmetric measure, since dij 6= dji in general. The
quantity dij is a property of two nodes, while the most
elementary damage in our cascade model affects edges.
Hence, the concept of distance has to be extended from
couples of nodes to couples of links. For instance, in
the case of an unweighted network it is possible to de-
fine the (standard) distance between two edges as the
number of hops along a shortest path connecting the two
edges. In the case of a weighted graph we make use of
the measure of effective distance in Eq. (12) to define a
distance between two edges as the minimal path length of
all weighted shortest paths between two edges. The dis-
tance between two edges can then be obtained based on
the definition of distances between nodes {dij}. Given
the trigger edge (a, b), the distance from edge (a, b) to
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Figure 7. Mapping the propagation of a cascade on the Spanish power grid. (a) The edges of the network are color-coded
based on the normalized arrival time of the cascade with respect to a specific initially damaged line, indicated as “Trigger”.,
and (b) based on their normalized distance with respect to the trigger using the effective distance measure in Eq. (12). In
both cases, darker colors indicate shorter distance/early arrival of the cascade. Normalization is carried out using the largest
distance/arrival time. Edges that are not plotted are not reached by the cascade at all. The analysis has been performed
using the Spanish grid with distributed producers with P+ = 1 (green squares), consumers with P− = −1/s2 (red circles),
heterogeneous coupling and tolerance α = 0.55.
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Figure 8. The cascade propagates through the power grid
with approximately constant speed if an appropriate measure
of distance is defined. Effective distances between the initial
trigger and secondary line outages are plotted as a function of
time. Each point in the plot corresponds to one edge, while
the straight line is the result of a linear fit. Results refer to
the Spanish power grid with the same parameters as those
used in Fig. 7.
edge (i, j) is given by:
d(a,b)→(i,j) = dab + min
v1∈{a,b},v2∈{i,j}
dv1v2 (13)
i.e., it is the minimum of the shortest path lengths of the
paths a → i, a → j, b → i and b → j, plus the effective
distance between the two vertices a and b.
Fig. 7 shows that the effective distance is able to cap-
ture well the properties of the spatial propagation of the
cascade over the network from the location of the ini-
tial shock. The figure refers to the case of Spanish grid
topology with heterogeneous coupling (see Section IV).
The temporal evolution of one particular cascade event,
which is started by an initial exogenous damage of the
edge marked as “Trigger”, is reported. Network edges are
color-coded based on the actual arrival time of the cas-
cade in panel (a), and compared to a color code based
instead on their effective distance from the trigger line in
panel (b). Edges far away from the trigger line, in terms
of effective distance, have brighter colors than edges close
to the trigger. Similarly, lines at which the cascade ar-
rives later are brighter than lines affected immediately.
The figure clearly indicates that effective distance and
arrival time are highly correlated, i.e., the cascade propa-
gates throughout the network reaching earlier those edges
that are closer according to the definition of effective dis-
tance. The relation between the effective distance of a
line from the initial trigger and the time it takes for this
line to be affected by the cascade is further investigated
in the scatter plot of Fig. 8. The reported fit indicates
that the two quantities are related by an approximate
linear relationship with regression coefficient R ≈ 0.83.
This means that the cascade propagates with a nearly
constant speed through the network when an appropri-
ate measure of distance, such as the effective distance
defined above, is adopted [61]. In contrast, a measure
of distance solely based on the topology of the network,
such as a standard graph distance equal to the number
of edges in the shortest path, shows a weaker correlation
with the actual arrival time of the cascade (see Supple-
mental Material).
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VII. DISCUSSION
In this work, we have proposed and studied a model
of supply networks highlighting the importance of tran-
sient dynamical behavior in the emergence and evolution
of cascades of failures. The model takes into account
the intrinsic dynamic nature of the system, in contrast
to most other studies on supply networks, which are in-
stead based on a static flow analysis. Differently from the
existing works on cascading failures in power grids [8–
11, 21–24, 51], we have exploited the dynamic nature of
the swing equation to describe the temporal behavior of
the system, and we have adopted an absolute flow thresh-
old to model the propagation of a cascade and to identify
the critical lines of a network. The differences with re-
spects to the results of a static flow analysis are striking,
as N−1 secure power grids, i.e., grids for which the static
analysis does not predict any additional failures, can dis-
play large dynamical cascades. This result emphasizes
the importance of taking dynamical transients into ac-
count when analyzing cascades, and should be considered
by grid operators when performing a power dispatch, or
during grid extensions [5]. Notably, our dynamical model
for cascades not only reveals additional failures, but also
allows to study the details of the spreading of the cascade
over the network. We have investigated such a propaga-
tion by using an effective distance measure quantifying
the distance of a line (link of the network) from the orig-
inal failure, which strongly correlates with the time it
takes for the cascade to reach this line. This naturally
leads to the definition of a propagation speed of the cas-
cade. Being able to measure the speed of the cascade
can be highly relevant when designing measures to stop
or contain cascades, since the propagation velocity deter-
mines how fast actions have to be taken.
While the swing equation is able to capture interesting
dynamical effects previously unnoticed, it still constitutes
a comparably simple model to describe power grids [36].
Alternative, more elaborated models would involve more
variables, e.g., voltages at each node of the network to
allow a description of longer time scales [62]. In addition,
we only focused on the removal of individual lines in our
framework, instead of including the shutdown of power
plants, i.e., the removal of network nodes. These simpli-
fications are mainly justified by the very same time scale
of the dynamical phenomena: All cascades observed in
the simulation are very fast, terminating on a time scale
of about 10 seconds, which supports the choice of the
swing equation [30, 36]. Furthermore, such short time
scales are consistent with empirical observations of real
cascades in power grids, which were caused in a very
short time by overloaded lines. Conversely, power plants
(nodes of the network) were usually shut down after the
failure of a large fraction of the transmission grid [4, 5, 7].
The same holds for load shedding, i.e., disconnecting con-
sumers. In order to further support our conclusions, we
have also performed simulations with a 3rd order model
that includes voltage dynamics (see Supplemental Ma-
terial), and we have found qualitatively similar results
to those obtained with the swing equation. Overall, our
work indicates that a dynamical second order model as
the one adopted in our framework is able to capture ad-
ditional features compared to static flow analyses, while
still making analytical approaches possible. This allows
to go beyond the methods commonly adopted in the engi-
neering literature, which are often solely based on heavy
computer simulations of specific scenarios, e.g. [63].
Furthermore, concerning the delicate issue of protect-
ing the grid against random failures or targeted attacks,
it is crucial to be able to identify critical lines whose re-
moval might be causing large-scale outages. As we have
seen, most of the lines of the networks studied in this ar-
ticle cause very small cascades when initially damaged.
However, our results have also unveiled the existence in
each of these networks of a few critical lines producing
large outages, which in certain cases can even affect the
entire grid. Within our modeling framework, we have
been able to develop an analytical flow predictor that
reliably identifies critical lines and outperforms existing
topological measures in terms of prediction power. As an
alternative to the analytical flow predictor, when a faster
assessment of criticality is required, the stable state flows
of the intact grid can be used, although they are less reli-
able. We hope these two indicators can become a useful
tool for grid operators to test their current power dis-
patch strategies against cascading threads.
In a time when our lives depend more than ever on
the proper functioning of supply networks, we believe it
is crucial to understand their vulnerabilities and design
them to be as robust as possible. The results presented in
this article represent only a first step in this direction and
many interesting questions remain to be investigated and
answered within our framework or similar approaches.
How is the propagation speed of a cascade linked to the
network topology? Which lines are affected by a large
cascade, and which parts of the network are able to re-
turn to a stable state? What are the best mitigation
strategies to contain a cascade or to stop its propaga-
tion? All these questions go beyond the scope of this
article, whose aim was mainly to provide a first broad
analysis of the importance of transients in the emergence
and evolution of cascades, but we hope our results will
trigger the interest of the research community of physi-
cists, mathematicians and engineers.
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